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While both the theoretical and the empirical literature on ambiguity are rich,1 there is
only limited interaction between the two. An important reason is that most ambiguity
models use concepts that are hard if not impossible to observe empirically. Most
empirical measurements of ambiguity have therefore resorted to pragmatic measures
that lack a foundation in theory.2 The purpose of this paper is to provide a bridge
between theory and empirics. We use Hansen and Sargent’s (2001) multiplier prefer-
ences model, which captures ambiguity aversion by a single parameter, to derive a
theoretically-founded measure of ambiguity aversion. We extend the multiplier prefer-
ence model to capture all kinds of ambiguity attitudes, we present a method to measure
the ambiguity parameter, and we apply our method in two large representative surveys.
Multiplier preferences are widely used in macroeconomics and finance to permit that
decision makers’ beliefs about economic phenomena are non-unique. In the multiplier
preferences model, decision makers rank payoff profiles f according to the criterion:
V fð Þ ¼ min
p
∫u fð Þdpþ 1
σ
R pjjqð Þ ð1Þ
where u is a utility function, q is a subjective probability distribution on the states of
nature, σ is a behavioral parameter, and R(p| | q) is the relative entropy of any probability
distribution pwith respect to q. The intuition underlying Eq. (1) is that the decision maker
has some best guess q of the probability distribution on the states of nature, but he does not
have full confidence in his guess and also considers other probability distributions p. The
plausibility of these other distributions decreases with their divergence from q, as
measured by the relative entropy R. The parameter 1σ captures the degree to which the
decision maker takes alternative probability distributions into account. The lower is σ, the
more the decision maker trusts that q is the correct distribution. In the limit, if σ goes to
zero, Eq. (1) becomes subjective expected utility.
The lack of trust decision makers have in their beliefs may result from ambiguity
(Hansen and Sargent 2001). In empirical studies, most subjects are not neutral towards
ambiguity, as assumed by expected utility, but are ambiguity averse. Multiplier prefer-
ences capture ambiguity aversion (by the parameter σ) while remaining analytically
convenient and easy to incorporate in economic models of aggregate behavior. However,
they do not accommodate ambiguity seeking, which limits their applicability at the micro
level where a wide range of ambiguity attitudes is typically observed and a substantial
proportion of respondents is ambiguity seeking (Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015).
This paper extends multiplier preferences to accommodate both ambiguity aversion
and ambiguity seeking. We give a preference foundation of this extended model that
complements Strzalecki (2011) and that makes multiplier preferences suitable for
microeconomic applications.
We then present a simple method to measure extended multiplier preferences. Our
method is easy to apply and measures multiplier preferences at the individual subject
level. Hence, we obtain an axiomatically founded measure of ambiguity aversion that
1 See Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) for a recent survey of the empirical literature and Gilboa and
Marinacci (2013) or Machina and Siniscalchi (2014) for surveys of the theoretical literature.
2 Exceptions are Dimmock et al. (2015,2016b).
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can easily be used in empirical research and that captures the heterogeneity in
individual ambiguity attitudes.
We illustrate our method using two large representative samples, collected by
Dimmock et al. (2015, 2016a, b) of the Dutch and the US population involving over
5000 subjects in total and we provide the first micro estimates of (extended)
multiplier preferences. Most subjects were moderately ambiguity averse, but be-
tween 23% (Dutch sample) and 36% (US sample) were ambiguity seeking. In both
samples, we observed that education and income were negatively correlated with the
deviation from ambiguity neutrality. In other words, respondents with more educa-
tion or a higher income were less likely to deviate from subjective expected utility.
The next section introduces the extended multiplier preferences model and
Section 2 its axiomatization. We then show in Section 3 how extended multiplier
preferences can be measured and present the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
1 Extended multiplier preferences
We use the Anscombe-Aumann setting. Let S be the state space, i.e. the set of all possible
states of nature s. S can be finite or infinite. One state s will occur but the decision maker
does not know which one. Σ denotes a sigma-algebra on S. Its elements are called events
and are typically denotedE. The set of all countably additive probabilitymeasures on (S,Σ)
is denoted by Δ(S) and is endowed with the weak* topology. A probability measure
p ∈Δ(S) is absolutely continuouswith respect to q ∈Δ(S) if for all E ∈Σ, q(E) = 0 implies
p(E) = 0. Let Δ(q) denote the set of all countably additive probability measures that are
absolutely continuous with respect to q. For any p , q ∈Δ(S), the relative entropy of pwith
respect to q is given by R pjjqð Þ ¼ ∫S log dpdq
 
dp if p ∈Δ(q) and R(p| | q) =∞ otherwise.
We denote the outcome set by Z.Δ(Z) is the set of all simple lotteries on Z. Elements of
Δ(Z) are denoted as x, y. The decisionmaker chooses between acts, finite-valuedmappings
from S toΔ(Z), which areΣ-measurable. Acts are denoted f , g. For eventE, fEg denotes the
act that gives f(s) if s ∈E and g(s) if s ∈EcwithEc the complement ofE. The set of all acts is
ℱ. Acts have two stages: the first stage corresponds to the uncertainty modeled by S and the
second stage to the risks modeled by Δ(Z). The mixture act αf + (1 −α)g for α ∈ [0, 1] is
the act that assigns the lotteryαf(s) + (1 −α)g(s) to state s for all s ∈ S. The decisionmaker’s
preferences over acts in ℱ are denoted by ≽ (with ~, ≻, ≼, and ≺ defined as usual). A
functional V represents ≽ if V :ℱ→ ℝ is such that f≽ g⟺V(f) ≥V(g).
Definition 1: We call ≽ extended multiplier preferences if ≽ can be represented by
V fð Þ ¼
min
p∈Δ Sð Þ
∫S u f sð Þð Þdp sð Þ þ 1σ R pjjqð Þ if σ > 0
∫S u f sð Þð Þdq sð Þ if σ ¼ 0
max
p∈Δ Sð Þ
∫S u f sð Þð Þdp sð Þ þ 1σ R pjjqð Þ if σ < 0
8>>><
>>>:
where u is a nonconstant expected utility functional, q ∈Δ(S), and σ ∈ℝ. We call these
preferences robust if σ ≥ 0 and opportunity seeking if σ ≤ 0.
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The novelty of Definition 1 is that we also consider decision makers who are
opportunity seeking (σ ≤ 0). Previous representations only considered decision makers
with robust preferences (σ ≥ 0).
In contrast with a decision maker with robust preferences, who tries to find options that
are maximally insensitive to remaining uncertainties, an opportunity-seeking decision
maker values options for which the remaining uncertainties can lead to high expected
utilities. He chooses the act that maximizes the highest expected utility he may reach
minus a cost, which depends on the divergence between the probability measures p used
to compute his expected utility and his best guess q. The parameter σ indicates to what
extent the opportunity-seeking decision maker is constrained in his search to maximize
expected utility. Themore negative is σ, the lower the cost of taking account of probability
distributions which deviate from his best guess. In the limit, if σ goes to minus infinity the
decision maker ignores this cost and chooses the probability distribution that maximizes
his expected utility, regardless how far off it is from his best guess.
An alternative interpretation of the extended multiplier preferences approach comes
from a comparison with ∫u(f)dp + θ[R(p| | q) − η], the Lagrange function deduced from
minimizing (in the robust approach) or maximizing (in the opportunity seeking ap-
proach) ∫u(f)dp such that the relative entropy does not exceed a threshold (R(p| | q) < η).
This comparison shows that the multiplier parameter θ ¼ 1σ is the Lagrange multiplier
of the optimization problem and can be interpreted as the shadow price of relaxing the
constraint imposed on the relative entropy (Hansen and Sargent 2001).
The parameter σ can be interpreted as an index of ambiguity aversion. Lemma A1 in
the Appendix shows that extended multiplier preferences are ordinally equivalent to
second-order expected utility (SOEU).3
V fð Þ ¼ ∫S φσ u f sð Þð Þð Þdq sð Þ
when φσ is exponential:
φσ tð Þ ¼
−e−σt if σ > 0
t if σ ¼ 0
e−σt if σ < 0
8<
:
and u, q, and σ are as in Definition 1. Axiomatizations of SOEU were given by Grant
et al. (2009), Nau (2006), Neilson (2010), and Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2012). Notice that
in SOEU as we define it here and as it is also defined by Strzalecki (2011), q is defined
over events and not over probability distributions as for example in the smooth model
of Klibanoff et al. (2005).
We know from Pratt (1964) that under expected utility the exponential utility function is
equivalent to constant absolute risk aversion. This implies that adding an amount c to all
outcomes of the lotteries under comparison does not change the preferences between these
lotteries. For the exponential function, the Arrow-Pratt index of risk attitude − u′′
u0
is constant
and equal to the exponential parameter. Under SOEU, we can give a similar interpretation
3 SOEU shows that ambiguity attitudes can be modeled by relaxing the assumption of reduction of compound
lotteries between the objective stage (the lottery f(s)) and the subjective stage (the subjective probability q(s)).
Segal (1987) first made this point using rank-dependent utility in both stages. Dillenberger and Segal (2015)
showed that Segal’s model also accommodates examples of ambiguity behavior proposed by Machina (2009,
2014) that most other ambiguity models cannot accommodate.
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to the exponential φσ function in terms of utility: adding the same (expected) utility to each
state of the acts under comparison does not change the preferences between these acts.
Grant and Polak (2013) describe this property as constant absolute uncertainty aversion.
The index − φ
0 0
φ0
¼ σ is then an Arrow-Pratt index of ambiguity attitude.4
Because extended multiplier preferences have only one parameter more than ex-
pected utility, it cannot disentangle ambiguity aversion and ambiguity perception
(unlike, for instance, the model used by Dimmock et al. 2015). As we explained above,
the parameter σ can be seen as an index of ambiguity aversion, but larger absolute
values of σ also imply that the decision maker considers a larger set of probability
distributions and, in that sense, σ can also be taken as an index of ambiguity perception.
2 Axiomatization
Strzalecki (2011) axiomatized extended multiplier preferences for σ ≥ 0, i.e. for deci-
sion makers with robust preferences. We will characterize extended multiplier prefer-
ences in full, i.e. including the case of opportunity seeking (σ ≤ 0). We do so by
dropping uncertainty aversion (his A.5) from Strzalecki’s set of axioms and by replac-
ing the results in his proof that depend on this axiom by others that do not depend on it.
We impose the following conditions on ≽:
1. Weak order: ≽ is complete and transitive.
2. Weak certainty independence: for all f , g ∈ℱ, for all x , y ∈Δ(Z), and for all α ∈
(0, 1), αf + (1 −α)x ≽ αg + (1 − α)x⇒ αf + (1 −α)y ≽ αg + (1 −α)y.
3. Continuity: for all f , g , h ∈ℱ, the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] :αf + (1 −α)g ≽ h} and {α ∈ [0,
1] :αf + (1 −α)g ≼ h} are closed.
4. Monotonicity: for all f , g ∈ℱ if f(s) ≽ g(s) for all s ∈ S then f ≽ g.
5. Nondegeneracy: there exist acts f , g ∈ℱ such that f ≻ g.
6. Weak monotone continuity: for all f , g ∈ℱ, for all x ∈Δ(Z), and for all {En}n ≥ 1 ∈Σ
with E1 ⊇ E2… . and ∩n ≥ 1En =∅, f ≻ g implies that there exists an n0 such that
xEn0 f ≻g.
7. Sure thing principle: for all E ∈Σ and for all f , g , h , h′ ∈ℱ , fEh ≽ gEh⇒ fEh′ ≽ gEh′.
An event is essential if there exist f , g , h ∈ℱ such that fEh ≻ gEh.
Theorem 1: If S has at least three disjoint essential events5 then the following two
statements are equivalent:
1. ≽ is a continuous, nondegenerate weak order that satisfies weak certainty indepen-
dence, monotonicity, weak monotone continuity and the sure thing principle.
2. ≽ has an extended multiplier representation.
4 Hansen and Sargent (2001) used θ ¼ 1σ as an ambiguity measure. We use σ instead of θ, because σ is a
monotonic and continuous measure and, therefore, more convenient for statistical analysis.
5 If only one event is essential then the Theorem also holds but the uniqueness properties are different. If
exactly two disjoint events are essential then the sure thing principle should be strengthened to the hexagon
condition (Wakker 1989).
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Observation 1: Two triples (σ, u, q) and (σ′, u′, q′) represent the same extended
multiplier preference if and only if q and q′ are identical and there exist α > 0 and β ∈ℝ
such that u′ =αu + β and σ′ = σ/α.
We can distinguish the robust and the opportunity seeking approaches using Schmeidler’s
(1989) condition of ambiguity aversion and its counterpart of ambiguity seeking.
Definition 2: Ambiguity aversion (seeking) holds if for all acts f , g in ℱ and for all α
in (0, 1), f ~ g⟹αf + (1 − α)g ≽ (≼)f.
Theorem 2: Under extended multiplier preferences, ambiguity aversion is
equivalent to robust preferences and ambiguity seeking is equivalent to opportu-
nity seeking preferences.
According to Theorem 2, the sign of σ determines whether an agent is ambiguity
averse or ambiguity seeking. But for σ to be a proper index of ambiguity aversion, it
should also satisfy the property that a higher value represents more ambiguity aversion.
We will show that this is indeed the case. Consider two decision makers i ∈ {1, 2}
represented by preferences ≽i. We use the definition of Bmore ambiguity averse^
proposed by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
Definition 3: ≽2 is more ambiguity averse than ≽1 if for all acts f in ℱ and lotteries x
in Δ(Z), x≽1 f⟹ x≽2 f.
This definition adapts the definition of Bmore risk averse^ introduced by Yaari
(1969) to ambiguity. It implies that the ambiguity attitudes of two decision makers
can only be compared if they share the same beliefs (here, the same q). Moreover, as
shown by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002, Proposition 11), the decision makers need
to have the same risk attitudes, which implies that their utility functions must be
cardinally equivalent: u1 ≈ u2 if there exist α > 0 and β ∈ℝ such that u1 =αu2 + β.
Theorem 3: Given two extended multiplier preferences ≽1 and ≽2 represented by
(σ1, u1, q1) and (σ2, u2, q2), the following two statements are equivalent:
1. ≽2 is more ambiguity averse than ≽1.
2. u1 ≈ u2, q1 = q2, and σ1 ≤ σ2 (if we scale utility such that u1 = u2).
Theorem 3 shows that σ is a proper measure of ambiguity aversion.
3 Measuring extended multiplier preferences
3.1 Method
Strzalecki (2011, Example 3) explained how the multiplier parameter σ could be mea-
sured when utility u is a power function.We describe an alternative method that makes no
assumptions about utility and requires fewer questions. Our method is easier to explain
using SOEU with φσ exponential and we will, therefore, use this model in what follows.
Because extended multiplier preferences are ordinally equivalent to SOEU with φσ
exponential, all results remain valid under extended multiplier preferences.
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Suppose that a ball is drawn from an Ellsberg urn with an unknown number of
yellow and purple balls (Ellsberg 1961). Let S = {Y, P} where Y stands for Bthe ball is
yellow^ and P for Bthe ball is purple^. The decision maker can win either $15 or nothing,
depending on the color of the ball. Hence, Z = {0, 15}. The act fY pays $15 if the ball is
yellow and nothing otherwise and the act fP pays $15 if the ball is purple and nothing
otherwise. Each lottery fromΔ(Z) can be written as 15r0, where r is the probability to get
15.We scale utility so that u(0) = 0 and u(15) = 15. Then u(15r0) = r
∗15 + (1 − r)∗0 = 15r.
Assume fY ~ fP ~ 15r0 for some probability r. We call this probability r a matching
probability of the acts fY and fP. Under SOEU, fY ~ fP implies q(Y) = q(P) = ½. In the
multiplier preferences model, this means that the decision maker’s best guess is that Yand
P are equally likely. The second indifference, fP ~ 15r0, then impliesφσ(15r) =½φσ(15) +
½ φσ(0). This equation has a unique solution σ for each value of r ∈ (0, 1) (see proof in
the Appendix). If r =½ , then σ = 0 and the decision maker is indifferent between an
objective and a subjective probability of ½. This corresponds to ambiguity neutrality. If r
<½ then σ > 0 and the decision maker prefers an objective probability of ½ to a subjective
probability of ½. This corresponds to ambiguity aversion. Finally, r >½ implies ambigu-
ity seeking (σ < 0).6 If r→ 0, preferences are extremely robust (ambiguity averse) and
σ→ +∞. If r→ 1, preferences are extremely opportunity seeking and σ→ −∞.
In the example above and in what follows, we use Ellsberg urns. The elicitation method
can be adapted to any naturally occurring complementary events Y and P for which fY ~ fP.
The Ellsberg urn offers readily available events that satisfy these conditions.
3.2 Calibration
Observation 1 shows that the sign of the multiplier parameter does not depend on the
scaling of the utility function, but its magnitude does. Hence, the scaling should be the
same for all subjects to perform correlation analysis. Fortunately, the scaling of the utility
function can be arbitrary under expected utility, because it does not affect the curvature of
utility and thus, risk aversion. In the empirical study reported in Section 3.3, we scale
utility of all subjects such that the utility of initial wealthW is 0 and that ofW + 15 is 15.
Beyond the issue of scaling, our method requires no knowledge of utility. We can immedi-
ately measure extended multiplier preferences for ambiguity without having to measure utility.
3.3 Empirical illustration
Two surveys have been held in which subjects answered questions of the form described
in Section 3.1. Dimmock et al. (2016b) ran a survey among 1900 participants of the Dutch
Longitudinal Internet Study for the Social Sciences (LISS). Dimmock et al. (2015, 2016a)
ran a similar survey among 3300 participants of the American Life Panel (ALP).7 We
illustrate our method by showing the σ values obtained from these two datasets.
6 For an early application of using matching probabilities to measure ambiguity aversion see Viscusi and
Magat (1992).
7 These papers analyzed a subset of their respondents, excluding subjects who took too much or too little time
in answering. For example, Dimmock et al. (2016b) excluded more than half of their subjects as these were not
incentivized. In our analyses, we chose to include all subjects as any exclusion criterion is to some extent
arbitrary. The numbers of observations we present are thus not identical to those mentioned in Dimmock et al.
(2015, 2016a, b), but our results are practically unaffected by the inclusion criteria.
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In both surveys, subjects had to choose between two urns: a known urn K and an
ambiguous urn A. Urn K contained 100 yellow and purple balls in known proportions.
Urn A contained 100 yellow and purple balls in unknown proportions. By default,
purple was the winning color, but subjects could change the winning color in the Dutch
survey. Only 1% of the subjects did so. Apparently, most subjects were not suspicious
and had no preference between the two winning colors. This implies fY ~ fP and
consequently q = 0.5.
The survey measured the matching probability r for which subjects were
indifferent between urn A and urn K with r∗100 balls of their winning color.
Subjects made a series of choices between the two urns to determine r, where urn
A remained the same while the proportion of winning balls in urn K changed
depending on previous choices.
At the end of the surveys, one randomly selected choice was played for real. A
ball was drawn from the urn that the subject preferred in that choice. The subject
received 15 euro (dollar in the US sample) if the ball was of his winning color and
nothing otherwise.
Figure 1 shows the estimated distribution of σ in the two datasets using a kernel
density estimate. In the Dutch (US) dataset, the median value of σ was equal to
0.05 (0.02), which corresponds with a matching probability of 40.6% (47.0%).
Both distributions are centered slightly to the right of zero and concentrated in the
ambiguity averse domain. Still, 22.6% (35.9%) of subjects were ambiguity seek-
ing. The box at the far left of the distribution shows that 6.2% (4.5%) of the
subjects gave matching probabilities close to 1, which corresponds with a value of
σ less than −0.8 (−0.6). Similarly, the box on the far right indicates that 9.6%
(3.6%) gave matching probabilities close to zero, which corresponds with a σ
value greater than 0.8.
Table 1 explores whether ambiguity attitudes were correlated with demographic
variables. The first and the third column show the correlations between σ and the
demographic variables, the second and the fourth column the correlations between
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Fig. 1 Kernel density estimates of respondents’ σ values. The Epanechnikov function was used, with a kernel
width of 0.07. The boxes at the upper and lower end indicate the proportion of subjects with σ values greater
than 0.8 and less than −0.8/−0.6
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∣σ∣ and the demographic variables.8 We also analyzed the correlations with ∣σ∣
because this indicates the deviations from ambiguity neutrality. Such deviations
imply violations of either probabilistic sophistication or dynamic consistency, two
conditions that are generally considered normative. Ambiguity neutrality is there-
fore often perceived as the rational benchmark in choice under uncertainty (e.g.,
Wakker 2010, p. 326).
In the Dutch sample, the only variable that was correlated with σ was age, with older
respondents being less ambiguity averse. The second column shows that age was
positively correlated with ∣σ∣, which suggests that older respondents had more
extreme ambiguity attitudes. Income and education were negatively correlated with
the deviation from ambiguity neutrality, which is consistent with the finding that people
with higher cognitive abilities deviate less from models of rational choice (Frederick
2005; Dohmen et al. 2010).
In the US sample, women were less ambiguity averse than men. Older and less
educated people were marginally less ambiguity averse. Although age and ∣σ∣ were
uncorrelated, in contrast with what we found in the Dutch dataset, the correlation
coefficients for income and education were remarkably similar to their Dutch counter-
parts. All correlations were negative, indicating that those with higher income and
education were closer to ambiguity neutrality.
4 Concluding remarks
Hansen and Sargent’s (2001) multiplier preferences are a popular model in macroeco-
nomics and finance. In its original form, multiplier preferences only capture ambiguity
aversion, which make them less suitable for applications at the micro level where
ambiguity seeking is also commonly observed. This paper extends multiplier prefer-
ences to include ambiguity seeking and it gives a preference foundation for these
extended multiplier preferences. We also show how extended multiplier preferences
8 The coefficients shown are Pearson correlation coefficients. Spearman rank-correlations show qualitatively
similar results.
Table 1 Correlations between demographic variables and ambiguity aversion (σ) and deviation from
ambiguity neutrality (∣σ∣)
Dutch dataset US dataset
σ ∣σ∣ σ ∣σ∣
Gender (female = 1) 0.012 −0.002 −0.054*** 0.011
Age −0.070*** 0.142*** −0.032* 0.001
High income −0.003 −0.047** 0.020 −0.060***
High education −0.005 −0.106*** 0.031* −0.064***
N 1821 1821 3217 3217
*significant at 10% level, **5%, ***1%
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can be measured and thereby obtain an axiomatically-founded measure of ambiguity
aversion that can easily be applied in empirical studies and that captures the substantial
heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes that typically exists in micro data. As an illustra-
tion, we applied our method to two large scale representative surveys, one from the
Netherlands and one from the US. In both samples a substantial fraction of the
respondents was ambiguity seeking, which illustrates the desirability of our extension
of multiplier preferences. Our data also indicate that better-educated respondents and
those with higher incomes were less likely to deviate from the rational benchmark.
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Appendix
Lemma A1: Preferences ≽ are extended multiplier preferences if and only if there
exists a σ ∈ℝ such that ≽ can be represented by SOEU with q ∈Δ(S) and φ =φσ.
Proof:
The equivalence between robust preferences and φ(t) = − e−σt has been shown by
Strzalecki (2011). It is based on Proposition 1.4.2 of Dupuis and Ellis (1997) stating
that for all countably additive probability measures q ∈Δ(S) and for all Σ-measurable
functions v:
min
p∈Δ Sð Þ
∫S v sð Þdp sð Þ þ 1λ R pjjqð Þ ¼ φ
−1
λ ∫S φλ v sð Þð Þdq sð Þ
 
For σ < 0, we apply this formula to v = − u ∘ f and λ = − σ and we obtain:
max
p∈Δ Sð Þ
∫S u f sð Þð Þdp sð Þ þ 1σ R pjjqð Þ ¼ − minp∈Δ Sð Þ ∫S v sð Þdp sð Þ þ
1
λ
R pjjqð Þ
 
¼ −φ−1λ ∫S φλ v sð Þð Þdq sð Þ
 
¼ φ−1σ ∫S φσ u f sð Þð Þð Þdq sð Þ
 
:
The last equality follows from φ−1σ tð Þ ¼ − ln tð Þσ ¼ ln tð Þλ ¼ −φ−1λ −tð Þ and φλ(v(s))
= − e−λv(s) = − e−σu(f(s))) = − φσ(u(f(s))).
Hence, both robust and opportunity seeking preferences are equivalent to SOEU
with an exponential φ function. ∎
Proof of Theorem 1:
(2)⇒ (1). Because (2) is a normalized niveloid that represents ≽ and u is nonconstant and
affine, Lemma 28 inMaccheroni et al. (2006) implies that ≽ is a continuous, nondegenerate
weak order that satisfies weak certainty independence and monotonicity. Because q is
countably additive, ≽ satisfies uniform continuity by Theorem 5.4 in Krantz et al. (1971).
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Finally, by Proposition 1.4.2 in Dupuis and Ellis (1997), (2) is equivalent to a second order
expected utility representation. Consequently, the sure thing principle must hold.
We show that (1) ⇒ (2) by closely following Strzalecki’s proof without imposing
uncertainty aversion. First we introduce some new notation. Let B0(Σ) denote the set of
all real-valuedΣ-measurable simple functions9 and let B0(Σ, K) denote the set of functions
inB0(Σ) that take values in a convex setK ⊆ℝ. LetΦ3 denote the set of finite partitions of S
that contain at least three essential events. For allG ∈Φ3, letA Gð Þ be the algebra generated
by G and let ℱG denote the set of acts in ℱ that are measurable with respect to A Gð Þ.
By Lemmas 25 and 28 of Maccheroni et al. (2006), there exist a real-valued noncon-
stant affine function u on Δ(Z) and a normalized real-valued functional I : B0 Σ;Uð Þ→ℝ
where U is the range of u(Δ(Z)) and such that for all acts f , g ∈ℱ, f ≽ g iff I(u ∘ f) ≥ I(u ∘ g)
and I(αψ + (1 −α)k) = I(αψ) + (1 −α)k for all ψ∈B0 Σ;Uð Þ, k∈U and α ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 1 in Grant et al. (2009) ensures that for finite S ≽ can be represented by f
⟼∑s∈S vs u f sð Þð Þð Þ with u nonconstant and affine and with range U and vs continuous,
nondecreasing, and with at least three vs nonconstant. Weak certainty independence then
ensures that indifference curves in the utility space are parallel and have common
supporting hyperplanes at the set of constant vectors in US . By the proof of Theorem 3
in Grant et al. (2009) it follows that for all G ∈Φ3 the restriction of ≽ to ℱG can be
represented by f⟼∑s∈S pG sð ÞφG uG f sð Þð Þ with uG nonconstant and affine, φG contin-
uous and strictly increasing, and measure pG : A Gð Þ→ 0; 1½  such that at least three
events in G are nonzero. In applying Theorem 3 of Grant et al. (2009), we replace
uncertainty aversion and their Axiom A.7 by weak certainty independence. Uncertainty
aversion is used in the application of Theorem 3 in Debreu and Koopmans (1982) to
derive differentiability of the functions vs. However, as noted by Grant et al. (2009) and
Maccheroni et al. (2006 ,p.1475, 1491), weak certainty independence implies Lipschitz
continuity and hence absolute continuity of the vs functions so that they can be repre-
sented as integrals of their (almost everywhere) derivatives. Because we no longer
impose uncertainty aversion, φ need not be concave as in Theorem 3 of Grant et al.
(2009). By Theorem 4 in Strzalecki (2011), ≽ can be represented by second order
expected utility f↦ ∫S φ u f sð Þð Þ dq sð Þ with q ∈ Δ(Z) and φ continuous and strictly
increasing. Strzalecki (2011) also imposed uncertainty aversion but he only requires this
to derive concavity of φ, which we do not impose. We only require φ to be nonconstant,
which follows frommonotonicity. q is countably additive by uniform continuity (Villegas
1964, Theorem 1). Moreover, if (u,φ, q) and (u′,φ′, q′) both represent ≽ then there exist
α , A > 0 , β , B ∈ℝ such that q′ = q , u′ =αu + β ,φ′(αr + β) = Aφ(r) + B for all r in U.
I represents ≽ and is translation invariant, i.e. for all f , g ∈ℱ and k such that f sð Þ
þk; g sð Þ þ k∈U for all s ∈ S, I(u ∘ f) ≥ I(u ∘ g) iff I(u ∘ f + k) = I(u ∘ f) + k ≥ I(u ∘ g) +
k = I(u ∘ g + k). It then follows that for all acts f , g ∈ℱ and k such that f sð Þ þ k; g sð Þ
þk∈U for all s ∈ S, ∫S φðu f sð ÞÞð Þ dq sð Þ≥ ∫S φðu g sð ÞÞð Þ dq sð Þ iff ∫S φðu f sð Þ þ kð Þ dq
sð Þ≥ ∫S φðu g sð Þ þ kð Þ dq sð Þ.
Hence, (u,φ, q) and (u,φk, q) defined by φk lð Þ ¼ φ l þ kð Þ;∀l; l þ k∈U are both
SOEU representations of ≽. Consequently, φ(l + k) = A(k)φ(l) + B(k). Because φ is
nonconstant, if U is unbounded, it follows from Corollary 1 in Aczél (1966,
9 A function is simple if it takes no more than countably many distinct values.
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Section 3.1.3) that φ equals φσ. If U is bounded then because φ is nonconstant Theorem
4 in Aczél (2005) implies φ = φσ on the interior of U. Because φ is continuous, the
extension to all of U follows.
By Proposition 1.4.2 in Dupuis and Ellis (2011) and Lemma A1, we then obtain the
extended multiplier representation. ∎
Proof of Observation 1:
The proof of Theorem 1 already showed that the probability measure q is unique and
that the utility function u is unique up to positive affine transformations. We also know
that for A > 0 and B ∈ℝ, φ′ = Aφ + B. Because e−σ
0
u
0 ¼ e−σ0 αuþβð Þ ¼ e−σ0βe−ασ0u, it
follows from the uniqueness properties of φ that σ
0 ¼ 1α σ. ∎
Proof of Theorem 2:
Ambiguity aversion states that preferences are convex. Hence it is equivalent to a
concave representation. Since u is linear with respect to mixture of lotteries, ambiguity
aversion is equivalent to SOEU with φ concave, which means σ ≥ 0. The opposite
reasoning applies to ambiguity seeking. ∎
Proof of Theorem 3:
(2) ⇒ (1) is trivial. Assume (1). It implies u1 ≈ u2 (Ghirardato and Marinacci 2002,
Proposition 11). We scale utility such that u1 = u2. Recode lotteries into expected
utilities. Using the second-order expected utility formulation of extended multiplier
preferences and the results of Yaari (1969), we immediately obtain q1 = q2 and φ2 more
concave than φ1, which implies σ1 ≤ σ2. ∎
Proof that there is a unique solution σ for each value of r.
fY ~ fP and fP ~ 15r0 jointly imply φσ(15r) =½φσ(15) +½φσ(0) , which is equivalent to
15r=½(15) +½(0) ifσ= 0 and to exp(−15σr) =½ exp(−15σ) +½ exp(0) otherwise. Hence,
r =½ if σ = 0
r ¼ − ln §exp −15σð Þþ§ð Þ15σ if σ ≠ 0
The proof that r is continuous and decreasing as a function of σ is elementary. By the
intermediate value theorem, there is a unique solution σ for each r ∈ (0, 1). ∎
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